Desert and Entitlement: An Introduction by Vallentyne, Peter
Introduction to Equality and Justice: Desert and Entitlement, Peter Vallentyne, ed., Routledge, 
2003. 
 
Desert and Entitlement: An Introduction 
Peter Vallentyne 
This is the sixth volume of Equality and Justice, a six-volume collection of the most important 
articles of the twentieth century on the topic of justice and equality. This volume addresses two 
issues: (1) desert-based conceptions of justice, and (2) entitlement conceptions of justice. Other 
volumes address the following issues: (1) the concept of justice, (2) whether justice is primarily a 
demand on individuals or on societies, and (3) the relative merits of conceptions of justice based 
on equality, on priority for those who have less, and on ensuring that everyone has a basic 
minimum, of the relevant goods (Volume 1); whether justice requires equality of some sort 
(Volume 2); the question of who (animals, members of other societies, future people, etc.) is 
owed justice (Volume 3); the question of what goods (welfare, initial opportunity for welfare, 
resources, capabilities, etc.) are relevant for justice (Volume 4 and part of Volume 5); and 
contractarian conceptions of justice (part of Volume 5). 
 
1. Desert  
Desert theories of justice hold that an action (social structure, etc.) is just if and only the 
distribution of benefits and burdens is appropriate given what people deserve. Desert can be 
understood in an institutional sense—according to which the principles of desert are determined 
by the prevailing institutional norms, current practices, or reasonable expectations—or in a non-
institutional sense—according to which the principles of desert are not so contingent. Desert 
theories proper are based on non-institutional desert, and in what follows “desert” should be so 
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understood. Non-institutional desert can be understood in a justice-determined sense—according 
to which the principles of justice determine the principles of desert, do not depend on them—and 
in a prejusticial (non-justice-determined) sense—according to which the principles of desert are 
prior to the principles of justice, and can be relevant for determining what is just. Because our 
focus is the determination of what is just, I shall use “desert” in its prejusticial sense. In this 
sense, facts about desert do not presuppose facts about what is just.1  
 There are a variety of views about the desert basis, that is, what determines how 
deserving people are. One could hold that desert is based on features of individuals that have 
nothing to do with their characters or agency (e.g., those of aristocratic families deserve more 
than others), but almost everyone agrees that desert must be based on something related to 
character or agency. Some might hold that desert is based on how virtuous one’s character is 
independently of what choices one has made, but most agree that it is somehow based on the 
desirability of the agent’s choices. Thus, for example, effort and contribution are often taken to 
be desert bases. Even here, however, there is disagreement, for agents may, as a matter of brute 
luck (e.g., genes at birth), differ in their abilities to make an effort or contribution, and it’s 
unclear why they should deserve more merely because they have more favorable endowments. 
Given that they don’t deserve their capacities, they don’t deserve, it has been argued, the benefits 
that flow from their exercise. This objection, however, can be dealt with by basing desert on how 
good a use, relatively speaking, an agent makes of her brute luck opportunities (e.g., capacities). 
Thus, for example, an agent that contributes 50% of her potential might be judged equally 
deserving as a less talented agent who contributes less but also contributes at 50% of her 
potential. 
 Desert theories also vary in what they take to be the deserved benefits and burdens to be. 
Well-being is a common specification, but there are many other possibilities (primary goods, 
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material wealth, etc.). The topic of what goods justice is concerned with is addressed thoroughly 
in Equality and Justice, Volume 4: Distribution of What? and in the second part of Equality and 
Justice, Volume 5: Social Contract and the Currency of Justice. 
Desert theories can take a non-comparative, comparative, or mixed form. Non-
comparative desert is concerned with each person getting what she deserves in an absolute 
sense—independently of what others deserve and are getting. Compared with giving no one a 
benefit, it judges it better to give one person a benefit that she deserves even if others are more 
deserving of that benefit. For example, if A deserve 5 units and B deserves 10 units, giving A 5 
units and B nothing is better than giving neither anything. Comparative desert, by contrast, is 
concerned with the benefits that each person gets relative to what others deserve and get. It 
judges it worse to give a person (and no one else) a benefit that she deserves, when someone else 
is at least as deserving of that benefit. In the above example, it judges it better to give each 
nothing than to give 5 units to A and nothing to the more deserving B. Mixed views are possible 
as well. 
 Desert theories pose a very direct challenge to egalitarian theories. If outcome desert 
theory is correct, then outcome egalitarianism (justice requires that the value of outcomes be 
equalized) is false. Individuals that are more deserving should have outcomes that are more 
valuable. Outcome egalitarianism, however, has been widely rejected on the ground that it leaves 
no room for agents being accountable for their choices. Initial opportunity egalitarianism and 
brute luck egalitarianism (discussed in Volume 4: Distribution of What?) each leaves room for 
agent accountability. The question is whether their accounts of accountability are more, or less, 
plausible as those of desert theory. 
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2. Entitlement  
According to entitlement theories, a distribution is just if and only if it came about without 
violating anyone’s rights (entitlements). Justice, on this view, is a matter of respecting rights. 
There is a wide variety of accounts of what rights people have: people may have rights to get 
what they deserve, rights to have their needs satisfied, rights to equal shares of some good, and 
so on. The mostly widely discussed entitlement theory, however, is libertarianism, and we shall 
focus on this view. 
Libertarianism holds that each agent owns herself (and thus killing her, striking, her, etc. 
is prohibited without her consent) and has certain powers to acquire private property in the rest 
of the world (natural resources and artifacts). Libertarianism views justice as a matter of 
respecting property rights. Because property rights protect negative liberty (freedom from 
interference), libertarianism views justice as matter of respecting negative liberty. 
Libertarianism holds that all agents are, initially at least (e.g., prior to engaging in any 
commitments or unjust actions), full self-owners, and that any violation of full self-ownership is 
unjust. The core idea of full self-ownership is that agents own themselves in just the same way 
that they can fully own inanimate objects. This maximal private ownership includes (1) full 
control rights over (power to grant and deny permission for) the use of their persons (e.g., what 
things are done to them), (2) full rights to transfer the rights they have to others (by sale, rental, 
gift, or loan), (3) full payment immunities for the possession and exercise of these rights 
(ensuring, for example, that the other rights are not merely rented and that taxation is not owed 
for mere possession or exercise), and (4) full compensation rights (which require others to 
compensate them if they violate their rights). 
At the core of full self-ownership are the constraints on how individuals may be used. 
Killing, torturing, or enslaving innocent individuals without their consent is unjust no matter how 
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effective these actions are as means to equality or other moral goals. More generally, agents have 
the right to control the use of their person. There are some things (such as physical contact of 
various sorts) that are unjust when done to an agent without his/her consent, and those very 
things are just when the agent gives his/her consent. 
 Two versions of libertarianism have come to be distinguished. Both hold that agents own 
themselves; they differ in their views about the powers agents have to acquire private property in 
the rest of the world. Right-libertarianism, which is the traditional form of libertarianism, holds 
that natural resources—resources that were not created by any agent (except perhaps God)—may 
be privately appropriated without the permission of, or any significant payment to, the members 
of society. It views natural resources as essentially up for grabs by the first person who 
discovers, claims, or (depending on the account) mixes her labor, with them. Although some 
right-libertarians literally hold that unowned natural resources can be justly appropriated by 
whoever gets there first, many right-libertarians—such as Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia—further require that the appropriation make no individual worse off in some appropriate, 
but fairly minimal, sense. It seems quite plausible that satisfaction of some form of such a 
proviso is a necessary condition for just unilateral appropriation, but it is arguably not sufficient 
for just appropriation. For private property rights over natural resources typically bring the 
owners significant benefits (even after making a payment to ensure that no one is made worse 
off). Some would argue that the benefits that natural resources (as opposed to labor) bring should 
be shared with everyone. 
Left-libertarianism takes exactly this position. It holds that natural resources are owned in 
some egalitarian manner (and that agents fully own themselves). This egalitarian ownership can 
take many forms. One is joint-ownership, according to which all use of natural resources is 
subject to collective approval (e.g., by majority or unanimous vote). Given that all actions by 
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agents involve the use of natural resources (e.g., land or air), this means that all actions of agents 
are subject to collective approval. Consequently, few individuals have defended this form of left-
libertarianism. Much more common is the view that natural resources may be privately 
appropriated, just as right-libertarians claim, except that agents must pay the competitive value 
(based on supply and demand) of the rights that they claim over natural resources. Rights over 
resources that no one wants require little or no payment, but rights over resources that many 
people want may be very expensive. The social fund generated by such payments is then divided 
up in some egalitarian manner. Here, again, this can take several forms. One is to divide the pot 
equally. Another is to divide it so that it best promotes equality of some specified sort (e.g., 
effective opportunity for well-being). 
Left-libertarianism, then, is a form of liberal egalitarianism. It holds the promise of 
reconciling liberty with equality. Unlike most versions of egalitarianism, left-libertarianism 
endorses full self-ownership, and thus places specific limits on what others may do to one’s 
person without one’s permission. Unlike the more familiar right-libertarianism, left-
libertarianism underwrites some demands of material equality. An on-going debate is whether its 
commitment to full self-ownership is compatible with a robust form of egalitarianism. 
Libertarian theories are examples of purely historical theories of justice. Whether a 
distribution of goods is just depends entirely on what the past was like. Principles of 
appropriation specify the conditions under which an unowned good can come to be owned, 
principles of transfer specify the conditions under which an owned good can be transferred to 
others, and principles of rectification specify what is to be done when one of the previous 
principles is violated. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick presented a powerful 
argument against non-historical patterned principles (e.g., with an pattern of equality or desert). 
Take any pattern, and suppose that everyone starts in the appropriate pattern (e.g., equality of 
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wealth). Individuals will be naturally inclined to make voluntary exchanges (e.g., to give Wilt 
Chamberlain some money in exchange for being able to watch him play basketball). The result 
of these voluntary exchanges will be to disrupt the specified pattern (e.g., Wilt Chamberlain will 
be much richer than others). Voluntary exchanges upset patterns, and hence if patterns are to be 
maintained, some freedom will have to be sacrificed. A natural conclusion is that any plausible 
theory of justice must be purely historical, but this would be hasty. The example shows that a 
plausible theory of justice will have to be partly historical (e.g., to make some agreements valid, 
to hold people accountable for some of their choices, to treat wrongdoers differently from the 
virtuous). It might still have a patterned component; it might, for example, require equality of 
initial opportunities of some sort without requiring on-going equality. 
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